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US/USSR MINI-PLenary MEETING NO. 3
U.S. Mission, 1100 Hours, December 15, 1972

Persons Present:

Ambassador Smith	Minister Semenov
Mr. Nitze	Gen. Trusov
Dr. Brown	Academician Shchukin
Gen. Allison	Mr. Grinevsky
Dr. Ifft	Mr. Chulitsky
Mr. Krimer	Gen. Beletsky
	Mr. Klukin
	Mr. Sudonkin

Discussion:

Ambassador Smith welcomed the Soviet Delegation and offered the floor to Minister Semenov.

Minister Semenov then presented his prepared statement (see Attachment 1).

Mr. Nitze presented his prepared statement on destruction, dismantling, and replacement procedures (see Attachment 2).

Minister Semenov said that the considerations presented by Mr. Nitze would be carefully studied. He then asked Academician Shchukin to present some remarks.

Academician Shchukin said that at the previous mini-plenary, Gen. Allison had given a useful clarification of the U.S. attitude toward the Soviet statement of November 28. In this statement, the Soviet side had discussed an obligation of the two sides to prohibit strategic ballistic missiles on air-based launchers. In using the term "air-based launchers", the Soviet side had in mind, in particular, aircraft. In his statement, Gen. Allison had not dwelt on that part of the Soviet statement which concerned strategic missiles on aircraft. Did that mean that the U.S. admits the possibility of strategic ballistic missiles on such launchers? Such launchers

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-2-

could serve as the first stage of a ballistic missile. This first stage could be used repeatedly, bearing in mind the future development of technology.

Academician Shchukin further remarked that it appears that there arise no doubts concerning verifying by national means compliance with such an obligation.

General Allison then presented his prepared statement in response to General Trusov's statement of December 8 (see Attachment 3).

Mr. Grinevsky then presented his prepared statement (see Attachment 4).

Ambassador Smith said that he thought it would be useful to respond today to Mr. Grinevsky's remarks. The matter raised by Mr. Grinevsky /non-transfer/ would logically have to be addressed following determination of the composition of the strategic offensive arms which are to be included in the prospective agreement and negotiation of the principal measures to be adopted for their limitation.

Ambassador Smith then called the attention of the Soviet side to the statement made on April 18, 1972 by the U.S. Delegation that the provisions of Article IX of the ABM Treaty do not set a precedent for whatever provision may be considered for a treaty on limiting strategic offensive arms. The question of transfer of strategic arms is a far more complex issue, which may require a different solution.

Minister Semenov said that, in his view, this question was one of great importance for our discussions. Of course, this question has various aspects, but if it were taken as a whole with a broader perspective, it seemed to him to be of interest to both sides. He thought that interest in observing this principle did not lie with one side only.

Ambassador Smith asked whether there were further observations to be made this morning. There being none, he suggested that the next meeting be a plenary session early next week. He suggested Monday, December 18, in view of the fact that the week would be a rather busy one with a number of tasks to be accomplished.

Minister Semenov said that he wished to clarify whether the U.S. side had in mind only one meeting next week or also a final meeting on December 21 or 22 as had been previously agreed.

SECRET - EXDIS

SECRET - EXDIS

-3-

Ambassador Smith said that he had in mind a plenary meeting early in the week and a final plenary later in the week.

Minister Semenov said that in that case the suggestion of Ambassador Smith was acceptable.

Ambassador Smith then reiterated that the next meeting would be a plenary session at the Soviet Mission at 11:00 a.m. on Monday, December 18. At that time the sides could set the date for the following session. He then adjourned the meeting.

Drafted by: Edward M. Ifft

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GS per R22
Approved by: Ambassador Smith

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SEMENOV MINI-PLENARY STATEMENT, December 15, 1972

The previous stage of the negotiations on the limitation of strategic offensive armaments was productive. The ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms, concluded as a result of those negotiations, deal with highly complex and substantive issues. On the basis of consistent compliance with the principle of equal security the sides succeeded in overcoming the difficulties arising in the course of negotiations and in arriving at mutually acceptable solutions. It also appears to be of no small importance that even before conclusion of the said Treaty and Interim Agreement, agreements were achieved on measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war and to improve the direct communications link.

Both sides have repeatedly noted the importance of the solutions achieved in terms of the positive development of Soviet-American relations.

The new stage of negotiations, which opened with this phase, is a most responsible one. It should culminate in working out an agreement on more complete measures to limit strategic offensive arms. In setting forth our considerations in connection

SECRET-EXDIS

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with the new stage, we have clearly articulated the Soviet side's interest in achieving such an agreement. Both sides proceed from the premise that agreement on limiting strategic offensive arms is possible solely on the basis of the principle of equal security and inadmissibility of unilateral advantages, with account for the particular security requirements of each side.

The Soviet side intends to adhere strictly to this principle during the follow-on negotiations as well. In this connection the whole complex of strategic offensive arms must be considered, and our position on their composition is well known to you. It can be seen from the course of discussions in Geneva that we are faced by a large number of questions to be discussed with the objective of finding a mutually acceptable solution. No doubt, we will be able to consider this matter in greater detail later.

In all this the productive development of our negotiations is of great importance. We proceed from the premise that even before achievement of full agreement on limiting strategic offensive arms, agreements on individual aspects of this problem can be concluded. These would be measures toward

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further limitation of strategic offensive arms. This would undoubtedly make the on-going negotiations more productive and meaningful in terms of the further positive development of Soviet-American and international relations. It will enable us, in the course of the second stage of the negotiations themselves, to make an effective contribution to achievement of their principal goal as well--working out a permanent agreement on more complete measures to limit strategic offensive arms.

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ATTACHMENT 2

December 15, 1972

STATEMENT ON DESTRUCTION,
DISMANTLING, AND REPLACEMENT PROCEDURES
(Mr. Nitze)

Both Delegations have called attention to the matter of agreed procedures for the destruction, dismantling, and replacement of strategic weapons systems and components in accordance with the provisions of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement. I believe both sides recognize the importance of establishing, at an early date, agreed procedures which are clear and workable, and which provide sufficient detail to ensure that there will be no misunderstandings concerning the implementation of the provisions of these agreements. As Ambassador Smith stated on November 24, until these procedures have been agreed upon, it will not be possible to carry out fully the obligations of the agreements.

Mr. Minister, you stated on December 1 that it would serve the interests of advancing our negotiations if the U.S. side were to set forth its views on these procedures. The U.S. Delegation believes that working out

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-2-

agreed procedures for the destruction, dismantling, and replacement of strategic weapons systems and components in accordance with the provisions of the agreements should be made a priority task of the SCC. The US views on specific procedures will be set forth in the SCC.

I will present today some general guidelines which we believe would be useful in the development of agreed procedures. These are:

(a) Dismantling or destruction procedures should be considered separately for each system, component, and type of launcher, based upon the pertinent features of each.

(b) Dismantling or destruction procedures should apply only to systems deactivated under the terms of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement.

(c) Where appropriate, more than one acceptable destruction and dismantling procedure from which each side may choose should be agreed for each system, component, and type of launcher.

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SECRET

-3-

(d) Any agreed replacement and destruction or dismantling procedure should ensure, inter alia:

- (1) that verification can be accomplished with high confidence by national technical means;
- (2) that replacement units and those to be replaced be identified and accounted for through appropriate notification procedures;
- (3) that unreasonable delays do not occur;
- (4) that reactivation of units deactivated and dismantled would be detectable by national technical means, and reactivation time would not be substantially less than the time required for new construction.

The U.S. side offers the above-stated guidelines in the interest of facilitating the working out of specific agreed procedures in the SCC.

We would welcome any ideas the Soviet Delegation wishes to put forward regarding procedures it believes would be appropriate.

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ATTACHMENT 3

December 15, 1972

RESPONSE TO TRUSOV STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 8
(General Allison)

The U.S. side has noted the statement by General Trusov in which he said there has been an expansion and acceleration of U.S. strategic offensive weapons programs such as TRIDENT and the B-1 bomber "despite the ABM Treaty and its restraining influence on the requirements for the capacity of strategic offensive systems."

Mr. Minister, the information on which General Trusov evidently based his remarks is not correct. I believe it important to the successful prosecution of our task that there be no misinformation impeding our progress.

The programs General Trusov referred to are long-term programs for modernization and replacement of existing strategic offensive weapons systems. These programs were publicly announced at inception, well before signing of the strategic arms limitations agreements. The schedule for completion of the programs is in the public domain; and the fact that each of the programs is generally on schedule is

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SECRET

-2-

a matter of public record. Each program has been identified clearly as modernization and replacement within the meaning of that term as used in the agreements signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972.

The fact is that no U.S. strategic weapons deployment program has been expanded or accelerated subsequent to the ABM Treaty and Interim Offensive Agreement signed on May 26, 1972. Further, there has been no significant reallocation of funds to these programs.

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GRINEVSKY MINI-PLenary STATEMENT, December 15, 1972

The USSR Delegation proceeds from the premise that agreement on more complete measures to limit strategic offensive arms must include obligations [to be assumed] by the sides, which would block the channels for a race in strategic offensive arms also in those areas that are not covered by the Interim Agreement.

The USSR Delegation's proposals advanced at this phase of our negotiations are aimed at precisely that goal.

Bearing in mind the task before us, we believe that it would be essentially important not to leave outside the sphere of our attention also the matter of preventing proliferation of strategic offensive arms through their transfer to third countries.

If this channel for the race in strategic offensive arms were not blocked, this could lead to undesirable consequences, both in terms of a negative effect on the stability of the strategic situation and in terms of the viability of the obligations [assumed by] the sides in connection with possible agreement between them on more complete measures to limit strategic offensive arms.

SECRET-EXDIS

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Indeed, if, for example, one side, while observing agreed levels for its own strategic offensive arms, were to transfer such weapons as it produces in excess of established levels to third countries, or began to render them technical and other assistance in the development thereof, thereby building up additional military potential, this would create unilateral advantages and violate the principle of equal security. It is quite obvious that thereby a channel would be opened up, by means of which established limitations on strategic offensive arms could be circumvented. This, in turn, would give an impetus to the race in strategic offensive arms, increasing the risk of a nuclear conflict.

I would like to note that with respect to the problem of limiting ABM systems, the non-transfer question was successfully resolved by the sides without any special difficulties, as witnessed by the mutual obligations provided for in Article IX of the ABM Treaty.

A positive solution to the problem of non-transfer of strategic offensive arms would also correspond to the spirit and letter of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which both the USSR and the U.S. are Parties.

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In connection with the above, the Soviet Union proposes that the sides assume the obligation not to transfer strategic offensive arms or their components to other states, and also not to provide them with technical descriptions or blueprints specially worked out for the construction of the strategic offensive arms subject to limitation.

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Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP80T00294A000300100002-9

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